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Abstract
Tender vessels in the United States will soon need to comply with new safety
regulations as mandated by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010. This thesis
focuses specifically on assisting in the formation of an Alternative Safety Compliance
Program (ASCP) for the unique tender vessel fleet and seeks to understand why tender
vessels experience fatalities and vessel casualties. By analyzing data of tendermen
fatalities and tender vessel casualties between 2000 and 2012, this report sheds light on
the realities of these incidents. Among other findings, the data show that the most
common cause of vessel casualty was striking rocks or the ocean floor, and most
common human error was falling asleep at the helm. This thesis then proposes potential
regulations that would be economically feasible and realistic for tenders by comparing
the casualty data to the reported financial realities of current tender vessels. Notably, the
analysis indicates that applying the current Alternative Compliance and Safety
Agreement (ACSA) to tenders would not be beneficial. Ultimately, the proposed
regulations herein should act as a foundation for a discussion regarding an alternative
compliance agreement, as the final agreement will be reached through a much greater
dialogue between many involved parties, including tendermen, regulators, safety
compliance experts, and others.

1

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Goal of This Thesis
This report seeks to understand why tender vessels, and the lives of those on
board, are lost in the 17th Coast Guard district. By working with tender operators, crews,
the United States Coast Guard, and other experts in the field of vessel safety and
procedures, this report analyzes recent data related to tender incidents and proposes
reasonable and effective regulation to mitigate future losses aboard these vessels. While
previous reports have thoroughly detailed cumulative vessel losses and worker casualties
in both the United States at large and Alaska specifically, this will be the first report to
focus exclusively on tender vessels, which is critically important to understand when
creating new safety regulations that will affect the Alaskan tender fleet.
Tenders constitute a specific fleet of vessels that do not directly catch fish but
instead act as a buying agent for seafood companies, purchasing, refrigerating, and
transporting fish from the fishing vessels to the shore processing plants or floating
processing vessels (hereafter referred to as “processors”). Tenders therefore have
important differences from other fishing fleets, and the regulations they must comply
with should be tailored to those differences. Just as an oil tanker and recreational ski boat
have obvious distinctions, there are less obvious, but just as important, differences
throughout commercial fishing fleets. Consequently, for a regulation to be effective, it
needs to focus on the reality of the specific fleet’s challenges. This report will therefore
shed light on the difficulties faced by tender vessels to help direct regulation that will be
in accordance with their needs.
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1.2 The Alaskan Fishing Business – Money and Jobs
The fishing industry in Alaska is an extremely lucrative and successful business.
In 2011, a study completed by the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute estimated the
direct and secondary economic impacts of the industry on the United States’ economy to
be $15.7 billion. The combined value of Alaskan seafood exports and the retail value of
those exports was estimated at $6.4 billion, $2.8 billion of which went directly to the
employees involved in the business (McDowell Group, 2013). The Alaskan commercial
fishing industry includes wild catches of Pacific salmon, Pacific halibut, Pacific cod,
groundfish such as rockfish and sole, sablefish, herring, four species of shrimp, sea
cucumbers, sea urchins, and pollock, plus 64 aquatic farms with oysters, littleneck clams,
and geoduck clams (McDowell Group, 2013).
The commercial salmon fisheries are the most valuable type of fishing by far,
accounting for nearly half of the entire economic value. Bristol Bay, off the southwest
coast of Alaska, also has the largest sockeye salmon fishery in the world, which alone
accounts for close to 100 million fish annually. While the pollock, Pacific cod, and other
groundfish and flatfish account for the greatest wholesale economic impact, at about
$2.88 billion in 2011, the salmon fishery has a higher multiplier because of the secondary
effects in the Alaskan economy. The salmon fishery’s wholesale value is about $2.45
billion. In 2011, Alaska hauled in 56 percent of the total U.S. commercial fishery harvest
by volume, or 36 percent by value (McDowell Group, 2013).
The fishing industry is also the largest private employer in the state of Alaska.
Overall, this means that one in seven Alaskans is employed because of Alaskan seafood,
and in 2011, the industry directly created 63,100 jobs in the state. When viewed more
3

broadly, the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute’s report estimated that the industry
provides 165,800 American jobs, including 34,000 jobs for Washington state residents as
well as thousands of jobs for hatchery managers, restaurateurs, grocers, and distributors
throughout the nation (McDowell Group, 2013).
The Alaskan fishery business is quite impressive on the global scale as well.
Somewhat surprisingly, about two-thirds of Alaskan seafood is exported around the
world (McDowell Group, 2013), with Japan receiving the largest percentage of imports
(Johnson & Byers, 2003). Only 10 percent of the U.S. seafood supply originates in
Alaska, and wild Alaskan salmon only accounts for about 23 percent of the total U.S.
salmon supply (McDowell Group, 2013). While the United States may not directly
consume the products of Alaska’s waters, the state of Alaska and the United States at
large reap the economic and employment benefits of these waters.
With these impressive, profitable numbers, the Alaska commercial fishing
industry may seem highly susceptible to overzealous fishermen and eager businessmen,
and at one point in Alaska’s history, it was. Between the 1940s and 70s, the Alaskan
salmon population was at the brink of extinction, mostly due to overfishing. However,
state legislation that limited the number of fishing permits per year and increased focus
on habitat protection and hatchery production helped salmon populations rebound to
record levels (Johnson & Byers, 2003).
Today, the entire industry is regarded as one of the most sustainable fishery
endeavors in the world. According to the most recent report by the National Marine
Fisheries Service, none of the Alaskan salmon or groundfish species are classified as
overfished. For more than three decades, Alaskan salmon harvests have increased beyond
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historical levels, and the Monterey Bay Aquarium’s Seafood Watch lists Alaska salmon
as the only salmon to earn a “Best” 1 rating. Further, no species of Alaskan seafood has
ever been listed as endangered under the United States’ Endangered Species Act (Alaska
Seafood Marketing Institute, n.d.).
To protect this haven for both fish and fishermen alike, each year the major
fisheries are managed by state and federal agencies which look to scientists and experts to
calculate sustainable harvests and set limits on total allowable catches. Some catches,
such as salmon, herring, and particular crab species, are regulated by the state of Alaska,
while federal entities regulate catches such as pollock, cod, halibut, and Bering Sea crab.
Once scientists in these organizations establish the catch volumes for the year, catch
volumes are allocated in order to best divide the available resources. By combining the
knowledge of fishermen, scientists, policy advisors, and government officials, Alaskan
seafood can be sustained for generations to come. The success and perpetuation of fishing
in Alaska therefore seems to be an economically, politically, and environmentally
profitable enterprise to pursue.

1.3 The Industry’s Hurdles
While the Alaskan commercial fishery industry is both lucrative and sustainable,
it also presents unique and momentous challenges. The United States Coast Guard
recently published a comprehensive review of lost American fishing vessels and crew

1

A “Best” rating is defined as a seafood that is “abundant, well-managed and caught or farmed in
environmentally friendly ways” (Monterey Bay Aquarium Foundation, 2014).
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fatalities throughout the entire nation. 2 Between 1992 and 2010, a total of 2,072 vessels
were lost, and 1,055 fatalities occurred in United States waters. Alaskan waters had the
highest death rate, with 239 individual deaths, or 22 percent of the total. They also
accounted for the largest proportion of vessels lost, with a total of 479 vessel casualties,
or 26 percent of the total vessels lost. Comparatively, the Eighth Coast Guard district,
which includes Texas and a large part of the Gulf of Mexico, accounted for the second
highest number of vessel casualties, at 365 vessels, as well as the second highest number
of worker deaths, at 200 individuals (Dickey, 2011).
As one of the most hazardous professions in the United States, Alaska
commercial fisheries collectively have a death rate that is 26 times higher than the
average for all U.S. workers (Lincoln & Lucas, 2010). Between 1991 and 1996, there
were a total of 146 deaths in the Alaska fishing industry, equivalent to 140/100,000 fulltime employees. Comparatively, for all workers in the United States, the annual fatality
rate during this time was 4.4/100,000 workers (Thomas, Lincoln, Husberg, & Conway,
2001). Throughout the year, the shellfish industry accounted for 46 percent of these
injuries, while in the summer months of July and August salmon fishing operations
accounted for 61 percent of the injuries (Dickey, 2011). Since the early 1990s, specific
efforts have helped reduce fatalities by 42 percent, yet between 2000 and 2010 there was
still an average of 46 deaths per year, which equates to 124 deaths per 100,000 workers
(Dickey).
Loss of life is clearly a serious and prevalent threat aboard commercial fishing
boats in the United States. Yet mistakes and mishaps at sea are also often fiscally
2

This report did not make distinctions between fishing and tender vessels. Therefore, we cannot reach
conclusions on the death rates of workers on tenders from the reports in this section.
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expensive. Capsizing, fires, and explosions can and have occurred on fishing boats, and
all have potentially deadly and expensive consequences. As previously stated, the U.S.
Coast Guard determined that 479 fishing vessels were lost between 1992 and 2007 in
Alaska, including 58 vessels in the last 5 years of the study (Dickey, 2011). In this study,
the most common cause of vessel loss was flooding, accounting for 36 percent of total
losses. Fires and grounding (or the ship running ashore) were the second and third most
likely causes of vessel loss, accounting for 20 and 16 percent of causes, respectively
(Dickey, 2011).
These losses are expensive, too. Another analysis, prepared for the United States
Coast Guard in 1997, estimated that the annual property, injury, clean up, and associated
costs of accidents on marine vessels to be almost $531 million annually. Notably, the
costs associated with U.S. commercial fishing vessel accidents were more than three
times greater than the costs of tanker accidents (Marco, Frederick, & Thomas, 1997).
But the commercial fishing industry need not be plagued with vessel loss and
worker casualties forever. The 1997 analysis ultimately concluded that implementing
accident prevention programs that focused on both preventing technological failure and
human error could save between $190.5 million and $317.5 million annually (Marco, et
al. 1997). Already, the fatalities in Alaskan waters have declined significantly, likely due
in part to a task force implemented in 1999 aimed at reducing vessel loss. The U.S. Coast
Guard’s 2011 analysis concluded that simple measures, such as training workers for
emergencies and using proper personal flotation devices and life rafts, could save many
lives, as water exposure caused more than three-quarters of all fatalities. Additionally in
this study, the Coast Guard found that only 10 percent of the individuals who died
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because of vessel loss were using a personal flotation device (PFD) or survival suit when
they entered the water, but fishermen survive more than twice as often when survival
equipment is properly used (Dickey, 2011).
Ultimately, there are obvious improvements that need to be made to protect
employees who participate in this fast-paced and strenuous business. While previous
data, including the analysis completed by the United States Coast Guard, clearly outlines
and documents many types of maritime casualties throughout the nation, this report will
be the first one to identify and document casualties that occur solely on tender vessels in
Alaska. In this respect, it will shed a new light on the particular issues that plague the
tender business and propose effective regulation to remedy the issues at hand. Some
regulation has already been implemented to protect those onboard commercial fishing
vessels of all types, but this report seeks to examine additional and/or alternative
regulation to offer new solutions to problems that persist in this rewarding, yet risky,
profession.

1.4 Alaskan Fishing Operations
The process of harvesting seafood is as varied as the fish consumers choose to
buy. In many fisheries, fish are taken from the sea by vessels such as gillnetters, trawlers,
seiners, crabbers, and trollers, and are then taken to a shore processing plant or floating
processing vessel (hereafter referred to as “processors”) on a separate vessel called a
tender. From the processor, fish are shipped throughout the world, oftentimes to buyers in
Japan or Seattle. To better understand the fishing business in Alaska, some of the
different types of vessels, including tenders, are described below. These various vessels
8

seek different types of seafood and occupy various regions of the Pacific Ocean
throughout the year, but they all operate commercially to catch fish and provide income.
• Trawlers: These boats tow nets along the bottom of the ocean to scoop up fish
which are too slow to outswim the net. Catches include pollock and cod.
• Gillnetters: These vessels put nets in the water and wait for fish to swim by and
become entangled in the net. These generally seek fish such as salmon or herring.
• Setnetters: This type of fishing is similar to gillnetting, but one end of the net is
tethered to shore while the other end extends up to 1,200 feet offshore. This type of
fishing concentrates predominantly on salmon.
• Seiners: These boats drop nets into the water and attempt to surround a school of
fish. They then close the bottom of the net and trap the fish. These boats
concentrate efforts on salmon and herring.
• Trollers: These vessels use bait and hooks to catch salmon on a line while at sea.
Because of the high quality of fish, these vessels generally produce the most
expensive catch.
• Longliners: These vessels drop long lines with many baited hooks into the water
attached to an anchor. The line is released and tethered to a buoy, and the fish
become stuck on the hooks. These boats catch halibut, cod, sablefish, and rockfish.
• Pot Vessels: These vessels place baited pots on the ocean floor. Crabs and cod
enter these pots but then cannot exit. The pots are later hauled aboard the vessel.
• Tenders: These vessels do not actively participate in fishing, but instead act as a
buying agent for seafood companies. They purchase fish from the fishing vessel,
chill the catch, and transport the fish to the processor and are responsible for
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ensuring the delivery arrives in good condition. These vessels help increase
economic and hourly efficiency for both the fishing vessel and processor. They
mainly operate in the herring and salmon industry, but their operations can include
cod, crab, sea cucumber, and catches from longline vessels. Further descriptions
of the tender vessel’s operations are discussed below.

Fishermen may also use a variety of fishing techniques throughout the year as the
fishing seasons change. For example, an individual may fish for sablefish in April,
herring in May, halibut in June, salmon in July and August, crab in the fall, and
groundfish in the winter. Other fishermen may choose to fish aggressively for three or
four months out of the year and pursue other interests or professions the rest of the year
(Johnson & Byers). As is evident from the above section, pursuing the Alaskan harvest
involves a wide variety of techniques, boats, and lifestyles.
While catching fish is the initial step in the Alaskan fishing industry, the fish must
also be prepared for market at the processor. These vessels and plants take the raw fish
and generally remove the head and eviscerate, trim, and wash each fish. The degree to
which the product is prepared varies between processors; some fish are processed and
frozen, some are canned, some are filleted and fully prepared for cooking or reprocessing,
while others are packed with gel ice and shipped to restaurants to be served soon after
they are caught.
Vessels that do not either process their fish directly or take their catch to a
processing plant largely rely on tenders to transport fish for them. This allows the fishing
vessel to stay on the fishing grounds for a longer period of time, thus maximizing their
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catch and profits. It also enhances processing efficiency at the processing plant or vessel
because tenders can deliver large volumes of fish in a short amount of time, which allows
processors to produce more product per hour without wasting time coordinating smaller
deliveries. Since fishing vessels cannot carry as many fish in one load when compared to
a tender, the turnover time to wait for fishing vessels to pull up to the processor, dock,
unload, and leave is quite time consuming and inefficient.
When a fishing vessel arrives at a tender, the tender uses a large vacuum pump or
a brailer bag hoisted by booms or cranes to transport fish from the fishing boat into the
tender. The catch is weighed by a scale, and the fisherman is given a “fish ticket” which
describes the weight and type of fish, the catch area, and the species of fish (for example,
sockeye versus coho salmon). This fish ticket essentially acts as cash, and the fishing
vessel may receive the money promised on the ticket at their earliest convenience.
On the tender, fish are either placed in slush ice or in refrigerated sea water tanks,
which can hold upwards of 500,000 pounds of fish. Oftentimes, these boats also assist the
fishing vessels by bringing supplies to those on the fishing grounds, including items such
as drinking water and food, and other luxuries such as cold drinks, access to hot showers,
and ice cream. A tender may unload more than a dozen boats before returning to the
processor, which then prepares the fish to be sold in the market (Johnson & Byers, 2003).
Unmistakably, the tender vessel, while not actively fishing, is still an integral part of the
Alaskan fishing industry.
Yet regulating tender vessels presents distinct challenges because of their unique
place in the industry. Operating a tender is not as profitable as fishing or processing, and
so owners often do not have large sums of money to invest in their vessel. Unlike other
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fishing vessels, which are paid for their catch, processors pay the tenders a daily rate for
their efforts. In this respect, tenders are seen as a business expense to the processor,
which means that their pay is minimal when compared to a processor or fishing vessel.
Of the price that consumers pay at retail, about 3 percent of that price goes to tenders,
while fishermen receive 10 percent, and processors earn 16 percent (Johnson & Byers,
2003). Even though tenders are guaranteed a somewhat consistent pay rate, they also do
not experience the windfall profit that comes with a larger catch. Because of this fixed
income situation, tender vessels are more likely to age and become worn without surplus
funds that can be invested in maintenance and safety (Duz, 2013). Regulation, therefore,
must account for a tender vessel’s limited budget.
Additionally, some other types of vessels, such as crabbers and trawlers, are used
as tenders during the salmon and herring seasons in order to generate income when they
are not fishing (Johnson & Byers, 2003). This means that vessels may have to comply
with two or more sets of regulations while also remaining profitable. Ultimately, tender
operators and vessels pose unique challenges to the Alaskan fishing industry and safety at
sea, and it is therefore important that those challenges are understood and met with
relevant and reasonable regulations.

1.5 Regulation: The Coast Guard, Congress, and More
1.5.1 The Coast Guard’s Authority and Jurisdiction
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is “authorized to enforce, or assist in the
enforcement of, all U.S. Federal laws applicable on, over, and under the high seas and
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waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” (14 U.S.C. § 2). The U.S. Coast
Guard is therefore able to enforce laws that delegate exclusive power to its organization,
and it also has the power to act when another Federal agency is referenced in a law.
Further, the waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction include not only waters in U.S. territory,
but also waters in which foreign countries have authorized U.S. law enforcement. By
following and enforcing the laws passed in United States Congress, the USCG is given
extensive authority to manage United States waterways.
The waters of the United States are divided into 9 districts, and each district has
its own governing Coast Guard body and official headquarters. The state of Alaska makes
up the 17th district, with its headquarters located in the state’s capital, Juneau. The Pacific
Northwest is included in the 13th district, with its headquarters located in Seattle. By
dividing the nation into specific districts, the Coast Guard is better able to focus on
certain issues that pertain to that area. For example, District 9 includes the Great Lakes
region, and their responsibilities and areas of focus are much different than those of
District 14, which is located in Hawaii. Therefore, this study seeks to work directly with
the 17th and 13th Districts, as forthcoming regulations will predominately affect these
regions. Undeniably, the USCG plays the central role in enforcing and maintaining laws
and regulations throughout the United States’ commercial fishing industry, and it is
therefore important that they perceive the regulations proposed in this report as both
enforceable and advantageous solutions to prevent tender vessel casualties.
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1.5.2 Current Laws and Regulations for Commercial Fishing
Vessels
In general, the laws and acts passed by United States Congress are codified in the
United States Codes (USCs). Executive agencies, such as the United States Coast Guard
or Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), then carry out these laws
through the development and enforcement of regulations. Regulations are designed to
increase efficiency and flexibility of Congressional laws, and they are generally created
through a process that allows public participation in the construction of regulations that
will affect the population. Unfortunately, citizens often overlook the opportunity to
participate in this creation process, yet it is an important step in forming effective, yet
reasonable, regulations. Agencies such as the USCG are assigned to promulgate
regulation because of their expertise and depth in a given subject matter. The USCG has
authority to enforce regulations in portions of Titles 33 and 46.
Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, delegates regulations in Chapter 1 to
the USCG while Chapters 2 and 4 are delegated to the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers and
the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, respectively. In Code of Federal
Regulation (CFR) 33, the USCG ensures accordance with rules pertaining to vessel
security, general boating procedures, transfers of hazardous materials, and navigation
safety regulation, among myriad other topics. Title 46, entitled Shipping, is divided into 4
chapters, of which the U.S. Coast Guard is to regulate and enforce Chapters 1 and 3 (the
U.S. Maritime Commission regulates Chapters 2 and 4). These chapters contain rules
regarding proper vessel certification, general operation techniques, hazardous chemical
management, safety procedures, and more. Chapter 1, Part 28 of this CFR concerns
14

requirements for the commercial fishing industry in the United States, and thus serves as
the basis for current regulations in the commercial fishing vessel industry.
Two major pieces of legislation, the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety
Act of 1988 and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 resulted in significant
amendments to Titles 33 and 46, and the United States Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2012 made changes as well. These Acts are the most important
pieces of legislation affecting safety for the commercial fishing industry in the United
States today, and they are discussed in greater depth below.

1.5.3 The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988
(CFIVSA)
The Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-424)
initiated regulation of the commercial fishing industry. This Act took effect in 1992 and
sought to address the unnecessarily high number of fatalities at sea. These new
regulations required vessels to carry life saving equipment, survival crafts, distress
signals, emergency positioning indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs), fire extinguishers,
emergency alarms, bilge pumps, and more. This Act also developed regulations for
watertight integrity.
The Act was very successful, as worker fatalities declined significantly after its
implementation (Garofolo, 1997). Notably, two important aspects of this Act helped
foster its success. First, it established an advisory committee, named the Commercial
Fishing Industry Vessel Advisory Committee, made up of fishermen, marine-safety
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representatives, safety equipment vendors, and other experts to help set safety regulations
and recommend measures to the Coast Guard. Fishermen and policy-makers alike
favored this advisory board, as it helped guide effective, yet efficient, regulatory
standards. Second, the voluntary dockside examination program was also a key
component to fostering this Act’s success (Garofolo). This program allowed fishermen to
request a free, no-fault examination by the Coast Guard to ensure their vessel’s
compliance with the law. These safety checks were extremely helpful in allowing
fishermen to get recommendations for improvements without fear of punishment.
This Act also broadened the USCG’s authority. It gave the Coast Guard
permission to complete safety checks at sea and to prevent vessels from operating if they
are not in compliance, helping to further enforce safety measures mandated by the Act.
The combination of no-fault, no-cost safety checks and the threat of enforcement action
helped enhance vessel safety and decrease lives lost in commercial fishing operations
(Garofolo).
A study completed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) found that between 1991 and 1999 the survival rates of workers in vessel
capsizing and sinking events steadily increased from a 77 percent survival rate between
1991 and 1993 to a 94 percent survival rate between 1997 and 1999 (Lincoln & Lucas,
2010). This data suggests that CFIVSA helped reduce worker fatalities when vessels sink
or capsize. However, while this Act improved the safety of many boats, there were still
many vessels classified as “uninspected,” which meant regular safety compliance
examinations were not mandatory. Additional legislation addressed these issues to further
enhance vessel safety.
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1.5.4 The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-281), signed by President
Obama on October 15, 2010, sought to address the persistent hazards in the commercial
fishing industry and improve upon the legislation in CFIVSA (United States Coast
Guard, 2013). This Act amended USC 46, required new safety protocols and equipment,
made significant changes to the sections regarding load lines and uninspected fishing
vessels, and further defined the requirements for the Alternative Safety Compliance
Program (discussed in greater detail below).
This Act required many new safety protocols. Instead of requiring simply a
“lifeboat or liferaft” as previously outlined in CFIVSA, all vessels that operate beyond 3
nautical miles are now required to carry “a survival craft that ensures that no part of an
individual is immersed in water” (46 U.S.C. § 4502(b)(2)(B)). Also, to improve overall
vessel safety, individuals in charge of vessels that operate beyond 3 nautical miles must
complete a training program every 5 years that includes topics such as fire fighting,
emergency drills, navigation, seamanship, stability, and more.
Other regulations in this Act apply directly to vessel construction and
maintenance. Vessels operating beyond 3 nautical miles are now required to complete a
dockside safety check every 2 years and carry certification documents on board, whereas
CFIVSA did not mandate such safety checks (the voluntary exams are still encouraged
for vessels that operate closer to shore). The Act also amended the section in Title 46
regarding load lines (the point at which the hull of the boat meets the water), making the
load line requirement mandatory for all vessels 79 feet long or greater and built after July
1, 2012 (Determining a Vessels Load Line Length, 2013). Additionally, alternative load
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line requirements for vessels that do not meet these specifications must also be formed
through cooperation between the fishing and regulatory factions.
The classification system for vessels has also increased in scope to include not
only processors but also fishing and tender vessels. This classification system is
essentially a series of safety checks and regulations outlined by the American Bureau of
Shipping and completed by the Coast Guard to ensure seaworthiness. Vessels that are at
least 50 feet in length, were built after July 1, 2013, and operate beyond 3 nautical miles
from shore are now required to comply. Fishing vessels, fish processors, and fish tenders
that do not meet the requirements for the classification system are required to comply
with an Alternative Safety Compliance Program (ASCP) to be written by the fishing
industry and regulatory agencies by January 1, 2017 and implemented by July 1, 2020.
The tender vessels that must comply with this program must participate in Aleutian trade
and fall into one of the following categories:

1) A vessel that is at least 50 feet in length, built before July 1, 2013, and is 25
years of age or older (in or after 2020), or
2) A vessel that is built before July 1, 2013 that undergoes a “substantial change
to the dimension of or type of vessel completed after the later of July 1, 2013,
or the date established by the Secretary” (46 U.S.C.§4503(d)).

If an owner operates 30 or more vessels that are mentioned in (1), they may enter
a compliance agreement effective January 1, 2030. This alternative compliance
agreement is an important program for understanding this thesis, and the details and
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reasons for this legislation are discussed in Section 1.5.6 on page 19. There is currently
one similar agreement in place, and the tender fleet in the United States will adopt
another, adapted compliance agreement as mandated by this Act.
The Authorization Act of 2010 will likely improve vessel safety in commercial
fishing fleets in the future due to the enhanced safety requirements and new classification
system. Yet this thesis seeks to understand why tenders specifically experience casualties,
with the ultimate goal of proposing effective regulations for this particular fleet.

1.5.5 The United States Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2012
President Obama signed the United States Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-213) on December 20, 2012. The changes this Act
made to Title 46 were not as significant as CFIVSA or the Authorization Act of 2010, but
are important for understanding current regulation nonetheless. This Act changed
dockside examination policy for relevant vessels by requiring checks every 5 years
instead of every 2. The examinations are also required for vessels built after July 1, 2013,
rather than July 1, 2012 as previously mentioned. Other changes in this Act leave the
Alaska fishing industry largely unaffected.

1.5.6 Alternative Safety Compliance Programs (ASCPs)
Federal regulation of the commercial fishing industry is, undoubtedly, more
stringent for newer and larger vessels. To avoid the burden of more stringent regulation,

19

many fishermen delay purchasing new boats and instead choose to run older, generally
less-safe vessels, which leads to more vessel and worker casualties. Maintenance costs
can also be very high on sea-going vessels, so fishermen may also decrease the amount of
processing or fishing they do in order to continue operating as vessels under less
regulation. Yet while this may be cost-effective for individual boats, these vessels are
much more prone to casualties and fatalities. In Dickey’s (2010) study on vessel
casualties between 1991 and 2010, vessels were more likely to capsize and lead to
casualties the older they were, and to combat these issues a number of Alternative Safety
Compliance Programs (ASCPs) are in development as required by the Authorization Act
of 2010.
There is one similar safety agreement currently developed, called an Alternative
Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA), and it applies to three different
catcher/processor (C/P) sectors: the non-pollock freezer trawler, the cod freezer longline,
and the pot cod sector. These vessels both catch and process fish, but there are
restrictions on the amount of processing a vessel may carry out under this program. For
example, a vessel in this program may remove the head, guts, and tail of the fish and also
process stomachs, cheeks, and roe. However, they are not allowed to fillet or process the
bones or belly flaps. These types of processing actions would classify the vessel as fully
classed and loadlined, which would create more costly regulation for the owner. This
program was first established by the United States Coast Guard in 2006 and last revised
in December of 2012.
To create agreeable regulatory standards for all parties involved, the Coast Guard
worked closely with C/P stakeholders and arrived at the current, evolving ACSA. While
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the full agreement and guidelines are quite lengthy, the main priorities of this Alternative
Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA) are highlighted below and divided into 11
subsections. These 11 inspection standards may serve as the starting point for future
regulation in the tender fleet and may be modified, augmented, and reduced as the data
prove necessary.
•

Vessel Stability: To ensure that the vessel is stable at sea, the boat must have
watertight bulkheads and closures, and the sea valves, automatic closure devices,
and sump pumps must be examined for integrity.

•

Drydock and Internal Structural Exams: The propeller, stern bushing, sea
connections, weldments, shell plating, sea chest, sea strainers, emergency bilge
suction, internal spaces, anchors, chains, and wires are inspected.

•

Hull Thickness and Gauging: Gauges must be on sections in the midship,
saltwater peak tanks, main deck plating, sea chests, and others.

•

Tail Shaft and Rudder Exams: The tail shaft and rudders are analyzed to ensure
that they are within the manufacturers specifications and that corrosion and wear
are at a minimum.

•

Watertight and Weathertight Integrity: High water alarms must be installed and
audible, door coamings are installed when necessary, and the vessel must have
watertight doors, hatches, and bulkheads.

•

Machinery Systems: Fuel systems must be made of specific materials, and gauges
on the tanks must be welded to standards. The fire safety hazards must be
identified, relief valves tested, and certain parts on the vessel must be fire
resistant, among other things.
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•

Life Saving Equipment and Arrangements: Life rafts must be approved under 46
CFR and one person must be able to launch them. Ladders must be installed for
embarkation, and immersion suits must be maintained to manufacturer’s
specifications and fitted with a strobe.

•

Fixed Fire Fighting Equipment and Arrangements: There must be fixed
firefighting systems in certain places on the vessel, and fire extinguishers must be
stored in specific areas, depending on the circumstances.

•

Other Fire Fighting and Safety Equipment: The vessel must carry portable
dewatering pumps and proper firefighting attire. Certain crewmembers must be
trained in fire fighting. A safety plan must be used in case of emergencies, and
Freon and halon detection systems must be used.

•

Emergency Drills and Training: Drills must be conducted by a trained individual
for disasters such as fire, flooding, abandon ship, and person overboard. Records
of these drills must be kept.

•

Emergency Communication and Navigation: Automated Identification System
(AIS) and Global Maritime Distress Signal System (GMDSS) must be installed
and operable.

After the vessel passes inspection, the Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections
(OCMI) may grant exemptions to regulation, and the vessel owner must carry a copy of
the exemption letter aboard the vessel. These safety checks must be performed
periodically (usually every two years) in order to maintain status under the ACSA
(United States Coast Guard, 2012).
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The Alternative Safety Compliance Programs mandated under 46 USC 4503 by
the Authorization Act of 2010 have not yet been implemented. However, the Coast
Guard, in partnership with stakeholders and experts, is currently working toward the
creation of mutually agreeable programs for different commercial fleets. The programs
seek to be specific to each fleet, taking into account the difficulties encountered by
different vessels. Thus, this report seeks to provide direction for the development of an
ASCP for tenders in the United States. By examining the C/P’s current, evolving ACSA
and its potential effectiveness and feasibility for tenders in light of their past accidents,
this report seeks to propose solutions that will effectively address problems that persist on
uninspected tender vessels at sea.

1.5.7 Other Means of Safety Enforcement
While the USCG plays an instrumental role in ensuring vessel and worker safety
through regulation and enforcement of federal laws, there are also other means of
improving vessel safety. The USCG can require vessels in certain geographical areas to
follow alternative regulation (in addition to the ASCPs discussed above), and other
governing bodies, such as the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) and the Alaska Scallop Association, can suggest safety measures or create
protocols within specific industries.
The halibut derby system is a prime example of how simply altering fishing
regulations can save many lives. Before 1995, halibut fishing in Alaska was operated on a
“derby” system, wherein fishermen were allocated 24-hour periods in which to catch as
many fish as possible. The dates of the derbies were established months before the day of

23

fishing and were not flexible to adjust for harsh weather conditions. Between the years of
1991 and 1994, there were 6 fatal events on commercial halibut vessels (Thomas &
Conway, 1999).
However, in 1995, regulatory bodies implemented individual fishing quotas
(IFQs) for halibut and sablefish, which allocated individual catch limits to each vessel.
The fishermen were then allowed 8 months in which to fill their quota. This allowed
fishermen greater flexibility of their hours, and it gave operators the ability to adjust their
schedule based on weather conditions (Thomas & Conway). Since this change, there have
not been any deaths on commercial halibut vessels. While this exact modification may
not be feasible in the tender business, this example proves that sometimes a change in
operational practices may help reduce accidents, too.
Similar changes in the crabbing industry have also helped alleviate workplace
hazards. Overloading crabbing vessels with pots has, historically, created many dangers
for the crabbing fleet and has caused vessels to capsize unnecessarily. However, some
safety measures have helped mitigate these risks. In 1999, the USCG initiated the At the
Dock Stability and Safety Compliance Check (SSCC) in the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands
(BSAI), which required preseason dock examinations to ensure that fishermen will not
overload their vessel. Also, in 2005, many of the BSAI crabbing fleets implemented
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) in a new “crab rationalization” program to alleviate
issues that arise in a derby fishing system (Fina, 2004). This system is similar to that of
the halibut regulation, and has also contributed to safety aboard crabbing vessels in
Alaskan waters. These two changes in regulation, the USCG preseason dockside checks,
and the crab rationalization program, have helped decrease the average annual fatality
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rate of employees in this industry by 60 percent. Between 1990 and 1999 there were an
average of 8 deaths per year, and between 2000 and 2010 there was an average of less
than 1 death per year. Further, of the 8 individuals who died between 2000 and 2010, 3
fell overboard, and 5 were lost from a capsizing event. The only vessel to capsize during
this period did not complete the SSCC (Woodley, Lincoln, & Medlicott, 2009).
Other organizations, such as the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) have also developed technology and recommended policy to ensure that
workers are protected at sea. Recently, NIOSH developed an emergency stop device that
can be retrofitted to any winch, which helps deactivate a winch in case of personnel
entanglement. NIOSH has also introduced a hatch and door monitoring system that
prevents flooding on vessels. This system has been tested in the Bering Sea and is in the
process of being licensed for the market (Lincoln & Lucas, 2013).
Lastly, associations within the fishing industry can, and have, helped reduce
vessel casualties. As previously mentioned, falls overboard without flotation devices
(especially in Alaskan waters) are one of the leading causes of fatalities. To address this
problem, the Alaska Scallop Association and individual vessels in the crabbing industry
recently established a 100 percent personal flotation device (PFD) policy for all crew on
deck. By educating crews and requiring all crewmembers to wear PFDs, leaders in the
development and implementation of this policy hope to reduce casualties due to
individuals falling overboard.
The previous examples make clear that there are multiple ways to reduce vessel
and worker casualties at sea. It is also important to note that the most effective
regulations often involve a collaboration of entities to combine expertise. Therefore,
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understanding the dynamics between regulators and other interested parties will likely be
the most effective way to create effective change in the tender industry.
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Chapter 2: Methods
This report analyzes data of tender vessel casualties between the years 2000 and
2012 in the 17th Coast Guard District. When an accident or casualty occurs aboard a
vessel in the commercial fishing industry, the owner is required by law to file a report
with the USCG documenting the incident. The Coast Guard then records and stores the
report, and oftentimes other federal organizations, such as NIOSH, have an agreement by
which they may access the data and complete analyses. Due to privacy laws, the original
data was not available for purposes of this study, but the NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office
generously processed the data and removed its distinctive features so that it could be used
in this report. The data of personnel fatalities encompasses the full 12-year time span
from 2000 to 2012, while the vessel casualty data only analyzes events between 2000 and
2009. In the fall of 2013, the data for non-fatal tender events between 2009 and 2012 had
not yet been processed by NIOSH, and it was therefore unavailable for the purposes of
this study.
The Alaska Independent Tendermans Association (AITA) also provided valuable,
important information for this report. Thirty-two current tendermen from across Alaska
filled out a questionnaire regarding their operations, expenses, vessels, and more. Leaders
at AITA then compiled these reports, removed distinctive features (so that the data may
remain anonymous), and then granted access to the data to enhance the scope and breadth
of this report. This made it easier to propose economically reasonable regulations.
Conversations with many other experts in the fields of occupational safety and
health, Coast Guard regulations, and fishing operations helped enhance understanding
throughout this report. Amy Duz, founder and CEO of iWorkWise, helped brainstorm
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potential regulations for the Discussion chapter, and she also provided general guidance
for the direction of this thesis. Visits to multiple tender vessels at port in Bellingham,
Washington and discussions of potential regulation and safety issues proved to be useful
in broadening the scope of this report as well.
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Chapter 3: Results
3.1 Fatal Events
Between 2000 and 2012, the NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office (APO) reported that
there were 3 fatal events on tender vessels. These deaths occurred on separate vessels and
were a result of three different causes. Overall, the vessels had an average year-built of
1971, an average crew size of 3, and an average length of 81 feet. All vessels were made
of steel, two vessels were tendering salmon, and one was not tendering fish at the time of
the fatality (Table 1).
One death occurred because the individual asphyxiated due to Freon™ exposure.
Another death occurred when an individual fell from the dock, intoxicated by
alcohol.
The third death (not in temporal order) occurred because a vessel was overloaded
(Table 1).
Table 1. A description of all fatal events and vessels involved in fatal events on tender vessels ≥ 50 feet in
length between 2000 and 2012 in the 17th Coast Guard District. Based on data from the NIOSH APO.

Vessel Description
Length (feet)
Crew Size
Year Built
Types
Vessel Hull Material
Steel
Event
Asphyxiation
Fall from Dock
Vessel Disaster

Average
81
3
1971
Salmon tender and not fishing
at the time
Total
3

Number of Crew on
Vessel

Total Fatalities
1
1
1
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Range
60 - 108
2-4
1962 - 1979

Cause
2
Freon
Unknown
Alcohol
4 Overloading

3.2 Non-Fatal Events
3.2.1 Overview
Between 2000 and 2009, the NIOSH Alaska Pacific Office reported that there
were 21 tender vessel casualties that did not end in fatalities. The average vessel yearbuilt was 1963 with a range from 1920 to 1998 (Table 2). The average crew size was 3
with a range from 1 to 6 individuals, and the average length was 81 feet, with a range of
50 to 165 feet (Table 2). Eighteen of these vessels were operating as salmon tenders, 1
was tendering herring, 1 vessel was fishing for sea cucumbers and transporting their catch
and the catches of others to town, 1 and the operations of one vessel are unknown (Table
2).
Ten of the tenders involved in non-fatal events were made of steel, 8 were made
of wood, and 3 were made of fiberglass (Fig. 1).
Table 2. A description of all vessels involved in non-fatal
events on tenders ≥ 50 feet in length between 2000 and
2009 in the 17th Coast Guard District. Based on data
received from the NIOSH APO.

Vessel
Description
Length (feet)
Crew Size
Year Built
Types

Vessel Hull Material of Tenders Involved in
Non-Fatal Events

Average

Range
81
50 - 165
3
1-6
1963
1920 - 1998
Salmon (18), Herring (1),
Cucumber (1), and Unknown
(1)

12
10

10
8

8
6
4

3

2
0

Steel

Wood

Fiberglass

Figure 1. Vessel hull material of tenders involved
in non-fatal events between 2000 and 2009.
Based on data received from the NIOSH APO.

1

This instance of “tendering” is different from the classic definition of a tender vessel. While they may
have been tendering cucumbers in a broad sense, the activities aboard this vessel were not typical of the
tenders in the Alaska Independent Tendermans Association (AITA).
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3.2.2 Events
Striking rocks or the ocean floor was the most common occurrence in the nonfatal events and accounted for 8 out of 21 (≈38%) accidents. The second most common
incident was fire or explosion, accounting for 5 (≈24%) events, while 4 (≈19%) vessels
experienced flooding. Less predominant causes of non-fatal events included
collision/allision (3 vessels, or about 14%) and being struck by a large wave (1 vessel, or
about 5%) (Fig. 2).

Non-Fatal Vessel Events
1

Struck Rocks/Bottom

3

Fire/Explosion
8

Flooding
Collision/Allision
4

Struck by Large Wave

5

Figure 2. Events resulting in a non-fatal tender accident between 2000 and
2009. Based on data received from the NIOSH APO.
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3.2.3 Human Error
Human Error Resulting in a Non-Fatal Tender
Accident

Only 12 of the 21 non-fatal tender
accidents reported a human error. Of these

8

7

7

12, 7 (≈58%) reported a human error of

6
5

falling asleep at the helm, 3 (25%) reported

4

3

3

drug use, and 2 (≈17%) reported a

2

2
1
0

navigational error (Fig. 3).

Asleep at Helm

Drug Use

Navigational Error

Figure 3. Human error resulting in non-fatal tender accidents
in Alaska between 2000 and 2009. Based on data received
from the NIOSH APO.

3.2.4 Human Error and Resulting Event
In 5 out of 12 (≈42%) human errors, the operator fell asleep at the helm and
struck rocks or the ocean floor. The 3 instances of drug use (25%) also led to the vessel
striking rocks or bottom, as did 1 navigational error (≈17%). There were also 2 events
(≈17%) where the operator fell asleep at the helm, which resulted in a collision or allision
event (Fig. 4). Therefore, all of the reported human error events resulted in the vessel
striking something, causing boat damage.
Human Error AND Event

6
5

5

4
3

3

2

2

2

1
0
Asleep at Helm and Struck
Rocks/Bottom

Drug Use and Struck
Rocks/Bottom

Asleep at Helm and
Collision/Allision

Navigational Error and Struck
Rocks/Bottom

Figure 4. Reported human error and the subsequent event aboard tender vessels
between 2000 and 2009. Based on data received from the NIOSH APO.
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3.3 Current Tender Operations and Expenses
3.3.1 Tender Dimensions and Operations
Thirty-two tenders across Alaska generously provided information regarding their
current expenses and practices. These vessels had an average year-built of 1956, with a
median of 1946 and a range of 1918 to 1987 (Table 3). The average vessel length was
89.2 feet, with a median of 83.5 feet and a range of 54 to 124.6 feet. Also, the average
maximum crew size was 4.6 individuals with a median of 4 and a range of 3 to 8 people
(Table 3).
The majority of vessels were made of steel (20, or 62.5%), while 11 (34.4%) were
made of wood, and 1 was made of fiberglass (3.1%) (Table 3).
These tenders spent an average of about 89 percent of their total yearly operations
tendering, with 99 percent as the median time. The most common reported percentage for
this variable was 100, and values ranged from 25 to 100 percent (Fig. 5).
Table 3. Reported data from 32 current tenders regarding vessel dimensions and
materials (2013). Based on data received from AITA.

Vessel Description
Length (feet)
Maximum Crew Size
Year Built
Vessel Hull Material
Steel
Wood
Fiberglass

Average
89.2
4.6
1956
Total
20
11
1

Median
83.5
4
1946

Range
54 - 124.6
3-8
1918 - 1987
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Tender operators also reported other uses for their vessels, including commercial
fishing, hauling freight, and surveys. 2 Nine out of 32 tenders reported fishing
commercially. These 9 tenders spent an average of 35 percent of their time commercial
fishing, with a median of 10 percent. Additionally, 8 out of 32 tenders reported hauling
freight throughout the year, with an average time spent hauling freight of 7.8 percent and
median time of 5 percent. One tender reported spending 2 percent of their year
completing surveys (Table 4).
Table 4. Average time spent by tenders on other activities as reported by 32
AITA tenders in 2013. 100% equals the full year. Based on data received
from AITA.

Activity
Commercial Fishing
Hauling Freight
Surveys

Number of
Vessels
9
8
1

Average
Time (%)
35
7.8
2

Median
Time (%)
10
5
2

Number of Vessels and Time Spent Tendering
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
25

40

55

70

85

More

Percentage of Year Tendering

Figure 5. Reported time spent tendering of tender
vessels in Alaska in 2013 (100%=total operational time,
n=32) (25=0-25%, 40=26-40%, more=86% or more, etc.).
Based on data received from AITA.

2

A survey is generally when a company or agency charters the vessel to do research. Fish and wildlife
agencies often do this to learn about sea life populations to accurately set fishing quotas for the coming
year (Duz, 2014).
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3.3.2 Income and Expenses
Twenty-seven vessels reported their gross income from tendering operations.
They reported an average of $258,777 and a median of $250,000. These gross incomes
ranged from $21,000 to $600,000 (Table 5).
Thirty vessels also reported their annual maintenance budget. 3 Of these vessels,
the average budget was approximately $51,200, with a median of $50,000 and a range of
$15,000 to $120,000 (Table 5).
Table 5. Reported gross incomes from tendering operations (n=27) and annual
maintenance budgets (n=30) of current tender vessels in Alaska (in dollars). Based
on data received from AITA.

Gross Income
Maintenance Budget

Average
258,777
51,200

3

Median
250,000
50,000

Range
21,000 - 600,000
15,000 - 120,000

Some vessels reported a range of values. In these cases, the average of the values was used to compute the
average and median. For example, if a vessel reported a maintenance budget of $30,000 to $50,000,
$40,000 was used to compute the averages.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
The deaths and vessel casualties aboard tenders arose from many different
problems, and this chapter proposes individual solutions for each type of casualty
category. First, solutions and potential regulation for the fatal events are proposed,
followed by the non-fatal events, taking into consideration the AITA survey data
completed by individuals in the fleet. The AITA data (Section 3.3) indicate that most
tenders spend the vast majority of their year tendering, and also that their incomes (and
associated maintenance budgets) from these operations are usually quite limited. This
means that the economic burden of each regulation was assessed before the regulation
was recommended in this report.
Finally, the current Alternative Compliance and Safety Agreement implemented
in the catcher/processor fleet is reviewed, taking into consideration the feasibility and
usefulness of this regulation as it relates to the tender fleet. Ultimately, the events and
accidents experienced by tenders are very different from other fleets, and the proposed
solutions therefore reflect the individualistic nature of the issues at hand.
Throughout this entire analysis, it is important to remember the financial situation
of most tender operators. While tenders and regulators understand that safety is a primary
goal, regulation that puts many tenders out of business should also be a primary concern.
Since tender vessels are usually older vessels that have been repurposed for tendering,
they are generally already in poorer condition than vessels in other fleets. The new
alternative regulations should therefore find a balance between increasing safety and
allowing operations to continue despite minor hazards.
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Additionally, the alternative compliance measures should not be subjective
measures in which a member of the Coast Guard dictates what they feel is best in a
specific instance, but an objective system that tenders can budget for year by year. This
will help tenders allocate time and money to certain projects without being surprised by
new, expensive repairs at inconvenient times. An untimely and unexpected repair could
easily cost a tender operator more than their business is worth, and it is therefore
important that regulators and the writers of regulation adhere to a structured, predictable,
step-by-step plan that all tenders can allocate resources towards. This will greatly reduce
the potential for economically devastating impacts of the new regulation.

4.1 Fatal Events
Between 2000 and 2012, there were only 3 reported deaths aboard tender vessels
in Alaska. This number is relatively low, considering that there were 107 total deaths
aboard fishing industry vessels in Alaska between 2000 and 2009 (Lincoln & Lucas,
2011). Also between 2000 and 2009, the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands (BSAI) fleet
experienced 12 fatalities and the Alaska salmon industry experienced 39 fatalities
(Lincoln & Lucas, 2011). While other fleets, such as the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands
(BSAI) crab fleet, have already undergone substantial changes in their safety policies
because of their very high death rates, the relatively infrequent deaths in the tender fleet
have helped slow the charge toward alternative regulation. Yet alternative regulation is
imminent, and the new regulations should therefore reflect the real threats in this unique
segment of the industry. It is important to remember that these deaths were preventable,
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and simple, cost-efficient measures should be taken to significantly reduce these risks in
the future.

4.1.1 Freon™ Exposure
Freon™ is a type of refrigerant used aboard most tender vessels to keep fish cold
during their journey from the fishing vessel to the processing plant. Freon™ is a
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) trademarked by DuPont that comes in many molecular
structures, the most common of which aboard fishing industry vessels is currently R-22
(Chlorodifluoromethane) (Duz, 2014). 4 Freon™ is a heavy gas that displaces oxygen
when it enters a space, leading to heart arrhythmia or asphyxiation if an individual
remains in the contaminated area. Unfortunately, death due to Freon™ exposure can
happen in many different industrial workplaces, often when an individual enters a
confined space without proper protection or without knowing that the area is
contaminated. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) reported 12 deaths in the 1980s due
to Freon™ exposure on land (Miller, 1989), and this refrigerant is a persistent threat in
the fishing and fish processing industries (Duz, 2013).
In the AITA survey, 27 out of 32 vessels reported using some type of Freon™ and
only one reported using ammonia. Although Freon™ can be lethal, simple measures can
be taken to significantly reduce the risk of harmful exposure. Freon™ detectors can be
installed in at-risk areas with a readout panel in a remote location to warn employees and
operators when there is a dangerous leak. These devices can be installed for $600 to $900
4

Although DuPont has trademarked Freon™, other companies manufacture refrigerants with the same
molecular formula and market them under different names. Freon™ is used in this report for readability
and because it is the nickname for all of these types of refrigerants in the industry.
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per sensor, and the readout panels cost around $1,300 (Duz, 2013). Compared to other
repairs and expenses, these detectors are quite affordable, and they are a very effective
way of reducing the risk of Freon™ exposure.
Although many tenders may not have these detectors already installed, the
detectors are a simple solution to a deadly threat. Freon™ exposure is a serious issue in
many industrial workplaces, and the risk of death should therefore be taken seriously.
Freon™ detectors aboard tender vessels will surely prevent future deaths, and they should
be required in all tenders that use Freon™ as a refrigerant.

4.1.2 Fall from Dock, Intoxication
One individual in this study died because they fell from the dock, intoxicated by
alcohol. Unfortunately, regulating alcohol consumption by commercial and recreational
fishermen is an extremely complex topic and cannot be adequately addressed in this
report. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (and in some cases
state occupational safety and health agencies) generally regulates safety on docks.
However, alcohol consumption usually occurs during non-working hours and is thus
outside the scope of occupational safety regulators’ enforcement. Proposing specific
regulations for the tender fleet related to incidents of this type is therefore unproductive,
as the nature of this death is beyond the scope of this analysis.

4.1.3 Overloading
Overloading, which resulted in one death in this study, is another preventable
issue. Overloading occurs when a vessel carries too much weight or carries too much
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weight above the waterline, which destabilizes the vessel and significantly increases the
risk of capsizing and downflooding. These events are usually a result of a human error
when an operator makes poor decisions and knowingly destabilizes the vessel. Thus, the
most important and useful way to avoid overloading is to limit unwise management
decisions made by operators. However, other measures may also be taken to reduce the
risk of overloading and encourage safe practices. Some of these potential regulations are
described below, but it is important to keep in mind that the best decisions will involve
the ideas and efforts of many parties.
In other fishing fleets, vessels are required to undergo stability analyses, in which
an outside party calculates the amount that the vessel can safely load onto their vessel
without significantly increasing the risk of capsizing. However, these stability tests are
extremely expensive. A single test can cost $25,000, which is almost half of the average
yearly maintenance budget as reported by AITA tenders. While 20 out of 32 vessels in
the AITA survey reported having completed a roll or stability test, more than half of
those tests occurred before 1991. Usually, new stability tests are required whenever a
vessel undergoes a significant modification, and since some tenders have made
significant changes to their vessel, many existing stability tests are likely inapplicable
now. Thus, even though about two-thirds of reporting tenders have completed a stability
analysis at some point in the past, most will need to complete new one, and many current
owners will not be able to do so because of the test’s associated economic burden.
Putting tenders out of business as a result of requiring stability tests would be
detrimental to both the tender fleet and those who depend on tenders for their services
(including fishing vessels and processors). Therefore, if the Coast Guard decides that
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some type of stability test is necessary, it should seek to create an alternative to the
traditional stability test. This test should be cost-effective, and it should provide some
leniency in operations for tenders. It may prescribe how much a tender vessel can load on
board, but it should not require the full mathematical analysis required for other fleets.
Rather than being an extremely rigid, strict system, the analysis should leave some room
for operations to continue despite small hazards on vessels.
It is also important that the requirements are implemented over a long time period
to allow tenders to adjust to the new regulations. Implementing a stability test in a matter
of two years (a very short time frame) would cause unnecessary burden on tenders, and
this burden is unwarranted because of the relatively few instances of overloading
disasters aboard the vessels. Although some sort of stability test may be inevitable, the
test’s design should take into account the economic challenges faced by the fleet.
Another alternative to a traditional stability tests might be regulation that dictates
where tender vessels can operate without a stability test. One of the longest and most
dangerous voyages that tenders undergo is the trip across the Gulf of Alaska, a large body
of water near the southeast corner of the state (Duz, 2014). This is an especially
dangerous crossing because of its length and exposure, as other vessels may not be
available to come to the rescue if problems arise.
Regulating tender voyages across this body of water may help reduce the risks
associated with overloading, and there are many options for increasing safety here
without requiring costly tests and analyses. First, the Coast Guard could require tenders
without a current stability report to make this crossing without loads on deck, thus
improving stability. Alternatively, they could require tenders to either make this crossing
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simultaneously with another vessel or operate within a designated distance from shore.
These measures might allow tenders to continue to operate in safer, more protected
waters without costly regulation. Of course, dangerous waters are still a serious threat
along shorelines and a vessel may still encounter trouble in these areas, but the increased
protection, as well the closer proximity to rescue personnel, make coastlines somewhat
safer for voyages.
The Coast Guard could enforce these rules by accessing a vessel’s Automatic
Identification System (AIS), which tracks the vessel and allows others to view its
location. Since all tender vessels either already have AIS systems or will be required to
use them in the near future (Lee, 2014), this would not be an added cost to tender
operators, making this type of regulation both effective and cost-efficient.
Again, while the suggestions described above may help avoid overloading
disasters, the most important factor in these accidents is the human factor. The ultimate
solution to avoiding overloading casualties and fatalities is proper decision making on
behalf of the operator, and their knowledge and experience is key. Even though solutions
with a price tag are often appealing when forming regulation, it is important to remember
that the operator is truly the most important variable when analyzing these issues.
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4.2 Non-Fatal Events
The hurdles experienced by the Alaskan tender fleet are much different than those
of the entire fishing vessel population. Data of all non-fatal vessel losses in Alaska and
the West Coast between 2000 and 2010 indicate that 6 out of 129 (27%) of the disasters
that led to non-fatal events aboard Alaskan fishing vessels were a result of being struck
by a wave (Lincoln et al., 2012), whereas only 1 (5%) of the vessels in the non-fatal
events for tenders occurred because a vessel was struck by a wave (Fig. 2). Similarly,
instability was a factor in 11 out of 129 (9%) non-fatal events in Alaska fisheries at large
(Lincoln et al.), whereas this was not a factor in non-fatal events on tenders. Finally, 35
out of 126 (27%) non-fatal events on fishing vessels occurred because the vessel struck
bottom or rocks (Lincoln et al.), whereas this occurred in 8 out of 21 (38%) events aboard
tenders.
Thus, it is clear that tenders require specific regulations that will help mitigate
issues that pertain directly to this fleet. Applying the current ACSA program or the
regulations that are used in the BSAI crabbing fleet would be ineffective and fiscally
burdensome for tender operators, and the subsequent sections seek to propose realistic
and helpful solutions to the issues faced by tender vessels. Solutions for each type of
vessel casualty are discussed individually (striking rocks/ocean floor, fires/explosions,
flooding, collision/allision, and struck by large wave), as well as the human errors that
resulted in casualties (falling asleep, drug use, and navigational error).
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4.2.1 Striking Rocks or the Ocean Floor
The largest proportion of vessel accidents occurred because a vessel struck rocks
or the bottom of the sea floor (8 out of 21, or 38%). These types of incidents are usually
due to human error, and solutions to these issues are proposed in the Human Error
section on page 50 under Falling Asleep At Helm.

4.2.2 Fire and Explosion
The second most common type of vessel casualty was fire or explosion,
accounting for 5 out of 21 (≈24%) events. These serious events often exhibit warning
signs before occurring, and although the data in this report do not show the cause of these
incidents, fires and explosions are often due to human errors of neglect and poor
maintenance, which generally have simple solutions.
The Coast Guard could therefore implement simple, cost-effective regulations that
should mitigate the risk of fires and explosions aboard vessels. These requirements may
include an annual inspection of the sleeving on fuel hoses, hydraulic hoses, and fittings
on these hoses to reduce the risk of fire. The regulation may also require proper storage
of flammable materials, (for example, away from the engine) the use of metal flooring on
steel vessels (as opposed to wood, which ignites easily, especially when soaked with oil),
and/or a visual inspection of electrical wiring and equipment. Evidently, these are all
general maintenance procedures that necessitate proper attention.
Additionally, most tenders must already undergo periodic surveys as required by
their insurer. This means that the vessels are already being inspected for some issues, and
requiring additional inspections would be feasible. Twenty-six out of 32 tenders in the
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AITA questionnaire replied that their insurer required periodic surveys, while only 6
responded that surveys were not required. Most of the tenders were required to complete
a survey every 2 to 4 years, with a range of frequency from 1 to 5 years. While an
inspection every 5 years may be insufficient, tenders are already accustomed to the
process, and regulators should therefore consider implementing additional inspections or
broadening the scope of the current inspections to reduce fire and explosion risks.
Although fires and explosions can likely be avoided by paying attention to general
maintenance without serious financial burden, extra measures may be necessary if these
options prove inadequate. Subsequent regulation could require some crewmembers or
operators to participate in basic fire prevention and fire fighting classes to enhance fire
safety knowledge, and these classes would be a relatively inexpensive solution. While
these classes are often helpful, it will also be important to specify who must be trained,
because it would likely be impractical to require every member aboard the vessel to
complete a training course. As with other fishing fleets, many crewmembers arrive in the
summer from far away to work. They usually do not have time to participate in a fire
safety class before boarding a vessel, and the classes are often not offered near their
hometown or at necessary times. Thus, requiring every member aboard the vessel to
complete a course would place a logistical and economic burden on the tender. It may be
more feasible, then, to require certain key operators or managers to complete a course so
that their knowledge can be applied to the vessel. Therefore, while fire safety classes
could be a helpful solution to tenders’ issues, it would be important to specify who must
complete the training.
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More advanced systems are also available if fires persist. Fixed systems, which
generally put out a fire in a closed space by filling the room with a gas or chemical
extinguishing agent, are a more sophisticated type of fire fighting equipment that require
airtight spaces to be effective (United States Department of Labor, 2014). Indeed, some
tenders have already implemented this technology. In the AITA survey, half (16) of
tenders reported having fixed fire systems.
However, fixed systems have serious drawbacks, and since installing a fixed
system can cost an operator thousands of dollars, other regulatory standards should be
implemented before resorting to these measures. When a fixed system is activated, the
entire vessel must be shut down without power for hours, leaving it adrift in the ocean
until the engine room may be safely accessed again, posing new hazards to the vessel and
crew. Furthermore, fixed systems may not be effective when a fire occurs. Ultimately,
these systems should not be the first line of defense in fire prevention or fire fighting
aboard tender vessels. Smaller preventive actions, such as routine maintenance
procedures and the use of appropriate construction materials, are generally much more
effective.
Thus, the Coast Guard should implement a compliance checklist for tenders to
follow to reduce their risk of fires and explosions. The associated inspection should be at
clear time intervals with very little room for inspector interpretation or subjectivity, and if
the vessel does not comply with the checklist they should be given time to perform the
maintenance to bring them into compliance. If this type of regulation is not effective in
reducing fires and explosions after multiple years, the Coast Guard and operators could
consider extra measures such as additional fire prevention courses, fire fighting training,
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or the installation of fixed systems. In general, however, many fire prevention strategies
are not very costly, and both tender operators and regulatory agencies should consider
implementing simple solutions as a way to significantly limit vessel casualties in a costefficient manner.

4.2.3 Flooding
Four out of 21 (≈19%) tender vessel casualties involved flooding. While flooding
can have disastrous consequences for both the vessel and those aboard, there are many
simple steps that owners and operators can take to significantly reduce their chances of
experiencing a flooding event. Similar to the previous section on fires and explosions, the
Coast Guard could effectively use a checklist of general maintenance procedures to
increase vessel safety.
Tender vessels generally flood as a result of downflooding, in which an initiating
event, such as a failed watertight hatch, a rogue wave, or improper through hull fittings
leads to water entering one or more of the ships compartments (Duz, 2014). Water from
that flooded area then enters other spaces on the vessel, ultimately leading to a large
flooding disaster. Luckily, there are simple, routine maintenance procedures that can help
reduce the risk of flooding. The Coast Guard, along with other involved parties, should
therefore formulate a checklist much like the one proposed for the Fires and Explosions
section (Section 4.2.2). This checklist would include inspecting the vessel’s hull materials
for watertight integrity, and it should also ensure that fittings are not corroded and safe
for use. Again, this checklist should be an objective list that tenders can follow year by
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year, and it should also have steps to be implemented over a substantial period of time
(multiple years) to reduce financial burden.
Since tenders are often older vessels converted from previous fishing boats, they
may use something called a “doubler” to reinforce the hull of their vessel, which may
also pose a flood risk. A doubler is often installed when a piece of steel on the hull of the
vessel becomes rotten and weak. Instead of replacing the steel with a new piece, some
operators layer a piece of steel on top of the old one to enhance the hull. In general, this is
not the safest solution to these issues, but it is much more cost-effective for operators
who may be under financial stress. In the AITA survey, there were 20 steel tender
vessels. Of those boats, 11 reported using doublers. When polled about what percentage
of their hull was covered in doublers, values varied greatly, ranging from 1 percent to 80
percent.
Replacing these doublers with new hull plating would be extremely expensive.
Seattle shipyards typically charge $2,000 to repair a small 12 inch by 12 inch section, and
a full sheet of steel may cost as much as $50,000 to replace (Duz, 2014). The prices vary
greatly based on the location and condition of the vessel structural members, too. For
example, if fuel tanks must be gas freed, 5 or if equipment must be removed and
reinstalled, prices increase. These potential repairs have very high costs that would likely
put many tenders out of business, considering that the median annual maintenance budget
for tenders is about $50,000. Yet some regulators might suggest that tenders replace their
doublers to reduce their chances of flooding. However, the casualty data do not show that
5

Before performing repairs around or near a confined space, especially a fuel tank, the space must be
cleared of all combustible gases and liquids. These procedures become very expensive rather quickly, as
the tanks are usually drained, cleaned, and then filled with an inert gas so that the welder does not cause an
explosion.
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tenders need to undergo such an expensive process, as there were no cases of doubler
failure reported in the data of tender casualties. Simpler maintenance may be just as
beneficial.
Thus, similar to the issues posed in the Fires and Explosions section, simple, costeffective measures should help decrease the number of vessel casualties aboard tenders,
and these issues should therefore be given first priority. Furthermore, expensive repairs,
such as replacing doublers, would be cost prohibitive for many operators and the expense
would place an undue burden on the fleet. Thus, there are many solutions to the problems
faced by tenders that will allow vessels to increase safety and also continue operations,
and those solutions should be the primary interest of regulators and operators.

4.2.4 Collision and Allision
There were 3 vessels (≈14%) that experienced collision or allision (an instance
where one vessel strikes a fixed object) events. Collision and allision often arise due to
the same issues in the Striking Rocks or Ocean Floor and Navigational Errors sections,
and the same solutions are therefore proposed. These suggestions can be found in the
Human Error section (Section 4.3.1) under Falling Asleep at the Helm on page 50 and
the Navigational Error section (Section 4.3.3) on page 54. Solutions that keep
watchpeople awake and alert and solutions that enhance navigational knowledge are
likely the same solutions that would help reduce these collision and allision events, and
they should therefore be strongly considered to prevent tender accidents in the future.
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4.2.5 Struck by Wave
There was one instance in this report where a vessel was struck by a large wave.
While this may be considered a “freak accident” and there may not be a realistic, helpful
solution to addressing this isolated incident, there are simple measures that vessels can
take to reduce their risk of harm if they were to be struck by a wave. These solutions have
already been discussed in this report, and they are discussed in more depth in the
Overloading subsection (Section 4.1.3) of the Fatal Events section on page 39. While
these solutions may not have helped this particular incident of being struck by a wave,
they nevertheless would increase tender vessel safety and would be realistic solutions to
the pervading problems at hand.

4.3 Human Error
4.3.1 Falling Asleep at the Helm
Falling asleep at the helm was the most commonly reported human error (7 out of
12 instances). These errors resulted in the vessel either striking rocks or the bottom (5 out
of 7) or a collision or allision event (2 out of 7). Therefore, to prevent many of the nonfatal events that occur, finding a way to keep individuals alert and awake at the helm
would be a very advantageous solution. Generally, operators in the tender fleet are
especially susceptible to falling asleep at the helm because of the long hours and limited
staff on board. Tenders often spend all day and night receiving fish deliveries and
traveling from one location to the next, and when the crew size is small (2-3 individuals),
the long, monotonous hours and rolling seas can lull even the most caffeinated individual
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to sleep. Luckily, there are many cost-effective solutions to keep tender operators awake
at the helm.
Watch alarms, also called bridge alarms or bridge navigational watch alarm
systems, are one of the most effective ways to ensure that operators remain alert. These
inexpensive pieces of equipment generally display a local signal (often in the form of a
flashing light) at designated time intervals where the operator is located. The operator
must then switch off the alarm, usually by pressing a button or moving his arm in front of
the sensor, indicating that he or she is alert and awake. If he or she does not switch the
alarm off, however, a louder alarm will sound, waking him and/or other vessel
employees. Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), an international maritime safety treaty to
ensure basic vessel safety, recently required that watch alarms be used in passenger and
cargo ships (with a phase-in period ending in 2018) to address similar issues aboard
different vessels (Germanischer Lloyd, 2013). While the price of these systems varies,
they generally cost about two thousand dollars for the equipment, which is a relatively
low cost for the longevity and utility of these safety systems.
Yet tenders do not frequently report using watch alarms. In the AITA survey, only
5 out of 32 vessels reported using such systems, a surprisingly low number for the issues
that they prevent. Because the data show that tender watchstanders are falling asleep at
the helm, mandating the installation and use of watch alarms would be an advantageous
solution for tenders. Additionally, it may be beneficial to require these alarms to be
linked to the vessel’s autopilot and general alarm systems. Since the risk of falling asleep
is the greatest when the vessel is running on autopilot, keeping tender operators awake
during this critical time would minimize the instances of needless accidents. Further,
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connecting the alarm to the general alarm system would help notify all other
crewmembers of potential emergencies before they have serious consequences.
Since striking rocks or the ocean floor accounted for the largest proportion of all
vessel disasters (35%), and of the recorded human errors, falling asleep accounted for
over half (≈58%) of these striking-rock incidents (and also all of the collision events),
keeping tender operators from falling asleep would likely be one of the most effective
solutions to reducing vessel casualties in the tender fleet. The tender fleet and USCG
should seriously consider requiring the use of watch alarms to help mitigate tender
disasters, especially because they are very cost-effective.

4.3.2 Drug Use
Drug use accounted for 3 out of 12 (25%) reported human errors, and all 3
instances resulted in the vessel striking rocks or the ocean floor.
Unfortunately, the data studied in this thesis are insufficient to reach a conclusion
and propose solutions for reducing errors related to drug use, and the nature of tenders
exacerbates this challenge. The data do not distinguish between types of drugs used,
including the distinctions between illegal substance abuse and alcohol consumption,
which would be an important differentiation to make when proposing drug-related
regulation. Additionally, tenders face other logistical challenges, including a limited
number of employees onboard and lack of administrative oversight or support. This
suggests that proposing drug use regulation, even if this data better described the
incidents, would be a great logistical challenge. Essentially, the shortcomings of the data
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set and realities of tendering make any potential regulation an ineffective use of
resources, and other methods would likely be more beneficial.
It would be much more advantageous to enforce more realistic measures, such as
requiring watch duties to be performed with an effective watch alarm. Watch alarms,
which keep an individual alert and notify others if that individual has failed to do their
duty, will likely significantly reduce the risk of the most common type of incidents that
tenders face. The limited knowledge we have of drug use aboard vessels and the
logistical challenges associated with tenders makes the aforementioned solutions the most
effective.

4.3.3 Navigational Error
There were 2 instances (≈16% of the total human errors) of navigational errors in
this data set, both of which led to the vessel striking rocks or bottom. This is a much less
predominate type of human error in the fleet, but simple measures can be taken to reduce
the risk of navigational errors. For instance, the USCG could require some operators or
watchmen to complete navigational classes to increase their knowledge of general
operational procedures and navigation techniques. Similar to the discussion on
firefighting and fire prevention classes on page 45, it would not be feasible to require all
employees aboard a tender vessel to complete courses in navigation because of their
temporary employment and place of residence. However, it is important that at least some
members of the crew have a thorough understanding of proper navigational practices. If
some operators have completed a course and are competent in their skills, it would be
beneficial for them to train other individuals on the vessel to increase general safety.
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Navigational errors were only reported twice in this data set, but navigational classes for
some specific employees would be a simple, effective solution to reducing these errors.

4.4 Current Alternative Compliance and Safety Agreement
The current Alternative Compliance and Safety Agreement (ACSA), used by the
catcher/processor (C/P) fleet, is a lengthy document with many requirements. While
some of the regulations may be helpful for increasing safety and staff competency, many
of the measures are very expensive and would not adequately address the issues faced by
the tender fleet as identified in this data set. It would therefore be very ineffective and
foolish to simply implement this program in the tender fleet.
Applying the current ACSA to tenders would put many operators out of business.
The catcher/processor fleet has a much greater income than the tender fleet (Duz, 2013),
and C/P vessels and owners can therefore afford to make many of the changes required
by the agreement. In order for tenders to remain in business, however, they must be
allowed to use the least extensive changes necessary for safety, yet ACSA often calls for
the most comprehensive maintenance procedures. This would impose an insurmountable
financial burden without much benefit.
Furthermore, ACSA would not even address many of the issues faced by tenders.
One of the predominant causes of vessel casualties in this data set was hitting rocks or the
ocean’s floor. The expensive maintenance required by ACSA would do little to address
this issue, and the problems should therefore be solved with more effective, affordable
solutions. The regulations proposed in this chapter would be more worthwhile for all
involved parties, and regulators should therefore look towards a different type of
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alternative regulation for the tender fleet rather than modifying the current ACSA
document.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
While this analysis lays a foundation for the future regulation of the tender fleet,
the best regulations will arise out of a collaborative process between operators, owners,
captains, regulators, inspectors, safety experts, and other individuals with a connection to
the tender segment of the fishing industry. The regulations proposed in this thesis should
therefore be understood as recommendations or a starting point for a discussion, with an
understanding that the actual compliance agreement should be reached through a much
greater dialogue between various parties.
However, this report’s findings do lead to some important conclusions concerning
the direction of the new regulation. After analyzing the data, communicating with
regulators, safety experts, and tendermen, and reading websites, books, and legal
documents, it remains abundantly clear that the current ACSA would not be an
advantageous solution to the problems that tenders face. In many cases, it would ruin
individuals’ businesses and destroy family incomes, and it would be much more
beneficial to implement simpler, more cost-effective measures that focus on alleviating
the actual risks that have been documented in this report. In general, these new
regulations should keep in mind a few main issues, including:
1. The limited income of tenders. Tenders have a very limited gross income and
maintenance budget when compared to other fleets. Regulators should therefore
consider the cost of any potential regulation,
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2. The timetable in which maintenance is required. Regulations should have a clear,
objective timetable of repairs and maintenance to perform. This will allow tenders
to budget for maintenance expenses with minimal surprise, and,
3. The objectivity of inspections and maintenance procedures. Inspectors and
regulators must remain objective when carrying out inspections. Regulations
should not be subject to change based on an individual inspector’s opinions,
which could create unforeseen financial burdens for operators.

In addition to these general considerations, and based on the data of past tender
casualties, the following specific regulations are proposed as a starting point to
increase worker and vessel safety aboard tenders in the United States while also
allowing most tenders to continue operations. The solutions are arranged from less
expensive to more expensive, but they should all be considered to address the
accidents that tenders have already experienced. The potential regulations include:
1. An alternative regulation to the stability test, which might include one or more
of the following: Requiring vessels without a current stability report to
make long crossings in pairs and/or stay within a designated distance
from shore and/or make crossings without loads on deck, especially when
crossing the Gulf of Alaska.
2. Install watch alarms that are linked to both the vessel’s autopilot and general
alarm systems,
3. Require some vessel operators to complete a navigational course before
operating the vessel,
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4. Create a routine compliance checklist to ensure that the vessel is not at risk
of fires and explosions (to be carried out at designated intervals by a surveyor
or an individual from the United States Coast Guard),
5. Create a routine compliance checklist to ensure that the vessel is not at risk
of flooding (to be carried out at designated intervals by a surveyor or an
individual from the United States Coast Guard), and,
6. Install refrigerant leak detectors in spaces that have refrigeration equipment.

Expensive repairs and maintenance, such as replacing doublers or installing fixed
firefighting systems, would be financially burdensome for most, if not all, tenders.
Therefore, the less expensive compliance measures should be implemented first and
given time to take effect. If the initial proposed regulations do not adequately address
tendermen’s issues and the same problems persist, then other measures may be
considered.
Lastly, it is important to remember that tendermen can spend large sums of money
on expensive and time consuming repairs, but unless the small, simple issues are
addressed (such as keeping operators awake at the helm), progress toward safer
operations will ultimately be slow, if not impossible. The greatest return on any
investments in tender vessel safety will come from the small, operational changes that are
implemented, which will both keep tenders in business and maximize their safety at sea.
It is therefore of the utmost importance that operators, regulators, and other involved
parties work together toward an effective, objective, and cost-efficient regulatory plan for
tenders, ensuring that the regulations are the best course of action for all involved parties.
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